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Abstract 
 
The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, a US based teachers association, 
strongly encourages teachers to make proof and reasoning an integral part of student 
mathematics. However, the literature shows that, far from being integral, proving remains 
compartmentalized within the North American school curriculum and is restricted to a 
specific mathematical domain. Consequently, students suffer in their understandings and 
are ill prepared for the rigorous mathematical proving that many of them will encounter 
later at the postsecondary level. The literature suggests that compartmentalization is 
mainly due to teacher’s lack of experience in proof and proving and their subsequent 
inability to guide students through the various stages of mathematical justifications. In 
this article, a brief overview of the history of proof is provided. Also, the nature of proof 
is explained and its importance in school mathematics is argued for. Teachers can help 
students better if they are aware of the stages that students experience over time as they 
become progressively more sophisticated at proof and proving tasks. By using a 
developmental model of proving, teachers are more likely to guide students effectively as 
they move from one stage to the other. Balacheff (1988) provides one of the most 
commonly used hierarchies to categorize student proof schemes. Few articles within the 
literature, however, apply this taxonomy in explicit ways by aligning examples of 
possible efforts to solve proof tasks with Balacheff’s stages of proof.  This article 
illustrates in accordance with Balacheff’s taxonomy and by using examples, how a 
student might tackle a proof task. It is also argued that even though explanatory proofs 
are relevant to school mathematics, overemphasis on verbal proofs may result in watered 
down mathematical proofs. With an example I also demonstrate that students can 
transition fairly easily from explanatory proof to formal two –column proof.  
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Introduction 
Proof is fundamental to mathematics. Mathematical proof has been regarded as 
one of the key distinguishing characteristics of the discipline of mathematics since the 
nineteenth century (Davis & Hersh, 1981). Indeed, Raman (2002), in her study, Proof 
and Justification in Collegiate Calculus, observes that “since the 6th century BC when 
Greek mathematicians established the axiomatic method, mathematicians have 
considered proof to be the sine qua non of mathematics” (p. 1).  Proof is “the glue that 
holds mathematics together” (M. Atiyah as cited in Dunham, 1994, p. 15).  
The term mathematical proof is not limited to a single definition: hence, it can be 
difficult to know, in any given context, exactly how the term is being used. The Oxford 
American Dictionary defines proof as “a demonstration of the truth of something” (1980, 
p. 535). Leddy (2001) offers one of the simplest and most practical definitions of proof: 
“a reasoned argument from acceptable truths” (p. 13). Yet, once one leaves simplistic 
definitions behind, the matter becomes more confusing. For example, a proof that is 
acceptable to a physicist might not be acceptable to a mathematician. Polya (1960) writes 
that 
in mathematics as in the physical sciences we may use observation and induction 
to discover general laws. But there is a difference. In the physical sciences, there 
is no higher authority than observation and induction, but in mathematics there is 
such an authority: rigorous proof.    
(as cited in Leddy, 2001,  pp. 11-12) 
 
In other words, as soon as there is sufficient evidence to support a scientist’s 
hypothesis,—and as long as there is no evidence against it,—s/he accepts the hypothesis, 
but among most mathematicians, a claim to proof involves more stringent criteria. The 
mathematician reasons that observation cannot prove by itself because eyes can deceive 
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us, measurement cannot prove because the certainty of the conclusion, depends upon the 
precision of the measuring instrument and the care of the measurer (both variable 
factors), and experiment cannot prove because the conclusions can only be considered 
probable and not invariable (Johnson, 2007). 
Even within the mathematics community itself, standards of proof vary due to the 
autonomous development of mathematical specialties and their subsequent isolation from 
each other (Almeida, 1996). A number of key words, long used within the mathematics 
education literature to refer to elements of proof,—such as “explanation”, “verification”, 
and “justification”,—convey different meanings depending upon who is using them.  
This multiplicity of meaning implies fundamental differences in how mathematicians 
conceptualize proof. Specifically, definitions tend to vary according to the 
mathematician’s perception of what constitutes an “appropriate formal system” (Hanna, 
1991, p. 55).  
Obviously, mathematical proof is a complex matter both in terms of the multiplicity 
of definitions that have been offered to specify the concept and in the variety of functions 
that have been attributed to it.   We see this complexity played out within educational 
contexts in a number of ways. How educators define proof and expect it to function 
depends upon the specific factors associated with the educational context including the 
teacher’s understanding of and experience with proof and the student’s age, grade level, 
and mathematical abilities.  
Since the closing years of the nineteenth century, mathematicians have narrowly 
defined proof in terms of logic (Davis & Hersh, 1981; Gardiner & Moreira, 1999). Frege 
(1884/1950), for example, defined proof as a finite sequence of statements such that each 
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statement in the sequence is either an axiom or a valid inference from previous 
statements. Many decades later, Alonzo Church (1956, as cited in Gardiner & Moreira, 
1999) demonstrated the same adherence to formal logic. According to Church, 
a finite sequence of one or more well-formed formulas is called a proof if each of 
the well-formed formulas in the sequence either is an axiom or is immediately 
inferred from proceeding well-formed formulas in the sequence by means of one 
of the rules of inference. A proof is called a proof of the last well-formed formula 
in the sequence.  
           (as cited in Gardiner & Moreira, 1999, p. 20) 
Joseph (2000) provides a more recent and succinct take on proof as logical formalism. 
Proof, he claims, “is a procedure, [an] axiomatic deduction, which follows a chain of 
reasoning from the initial assumptions to the final conclusion” (p. 127).  
Over the years, however, many mathematicians have come to define proof in 
broader terms. Almost thirty five years ago, Lakatos (1976) described mathematics as an 
open subject that is constantly being developed and changed through proofs and 
refutations.  He suggested that the definition of proof should be expanded to include 
explanations, justifications and elaborations of any conjecture subjected to counter 
examples. Lakatos’ view reflects the assumption that proof depends on the insights of the 
active mathematician and not on mechanistic rules and procedures. Indeed, perceptions of 
what proof is have changed to such a degree that, little more than a decade ago, 
mathematician Thurston (1995) claimed, “for the present, formal proofs [in the sense of 
symbolic logic] are out of reach and mostly irrelevant” (p. 34). Even more inclusive is 
Hanna’s (1995) definition. She insists that the best proof is one that helps us understand 
the meaning of the theorem that is being proved. She notes that such proofs help us to 
see, not only that a theorem is true, but also why it is true.  These, Hanna claims, are more 
convincing and more likely to lead to further discoveries.  Hence, in school mathematics, 
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the proofs that explain—narrative proofs—are much more important because they 
facilitate understanding (Hanna, 1990).  In the end, whether one defines proof narrowly 
or broadly, it is important to remember that proof is an art and the act of proving can 
“evoke a profound sense of beauty and surprise” (Moreira, 1999, p. 349).  
 Given that mathematicians differ in their perception of what it is that constitutes a   
mathematical proof, it follows that they would also differ in their understanding of the 
role played by proof within mathematics. Indeed, one’s view of what it is that proofs do 
typically influences how one defines the term.  Various mathematicians and mathematics 
educators,  Bell, 1976; de Villiers, 1990, 1999; Hanna, 2000; Hanna & Jahnke, 1996; 
Lucast, 2003; Luthuli, 1996; Marrades & Gutierrez, 2000; Leddy (2001), have identified 
the functions of proof and proving as: verification or justification (concerned with the 
truth of a statement); explanation (providing insight into why a statement is true); 
systemization (the organization of various results into a deductive system of axioms, 
major concepts and theorems); discovery (the discovery or invention of new results); 
communication (the transmission of mathematical knowledge); construction of an 
empirical theory; exploration of the meaning of a definition or the consequences of an 
assumption; incorporation of a well-known fact into a new framework, viewing it from a 
fresh perspective; providing an intellectual challenge to the author of the proof, and so 
on. 
A Brief History of Proof  
If one defines proof broadly, one can find evidence of mathematical proof in the 
extant computations of various cultural groups that pre-date the ancient Greeks. Of 
course, few would disagree with Szabo’s (1972, as cited in Siu, 1993) assertion that the 
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concept of deductive science was unknown to the eastern people of antiquity before the 
development of Greek culture.  He maintains that 
in the mathematical documents which [have come] down to us from these 
[Eastern] people, there are no theorems or demonstrations and the fundamental 
concepts of deduction, definition and axiom have not yet been formed. These 
fundamental concepts made their first appearance in Greek Mathematics. 
 
        (as cited in Siu, 1993, p. 345) 
Indeed, if one defines “mathematical proof as a deductive demonstration of a statement 
based on clearly formulated definitions and postulates” (Siu, 1993, p. 345), then one must 
conclude that no proofs can be found in the surviving mathematical texts of the ancient 
Chinese, Indian, Egyptian or Babylonian peoples (Joseph, 2000).  However, one does see 
within these texts a technical facility with computation, recognition of the applicability of 
certain procedures to a set of similar problems, and an understanding of the importance of 
verifying the correctness of a procedure (Joseph, 2000).  If one defines proof generally as 
an explanatory note that serves to convince or enlighten the reader, then one can, in fact, 
identify an abundance of mathematical proofs and proving within these ancient texts.  As 
Wilder (1978) reminds us, “we must not forget that what constitutes proof varies from 
culture to culture, as well as age to age” (p. 69). 
The Greeks, in an attempt to lay solid foundations for geometry, were the first to 
introduce a version of the axiomatic method in mathematics (Hanna, 1983). Up to the 
time of Thales of Miletus (640-546 B.C.) two different ways to communicate 
mathematical statements were commonly used: illustrative examples that served as 
templates for a general statement or diagrams that made the statement obvious. The 
former told a reader how to obtain a result, while the latter helped the viewer internalize 
the idea by gaining an insight into why the idea was correct. Thales conceived of the need 
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to reduce by logical argument the mathematical statements to simpler facts so as to make 
proof more convincing. He set out to prove geometric properties of figures by deduction 
rather than by measurement. By the time of the Pythagorean School (5th century BC), 
proofs were quite well established, but mostly in paragraph form. Specifically, Euclid 
understood proof as a convincing argument based on intuitive truths in the human culture 
(Hanna, 1983).    
Given the influence of the Greeks and geometry, the deductive approach in 
mathematics came to be referred to in the nineteenth century as the geometrical or 
Euclidean method. According to Grabiner (1974; cited in Hanna, 1983), during those 
years, a desire to focus and narrow mathematical results and avoid errors, as well as a 
need to formalize mathematical results, all played a part in stimulating a growing interest 
in formal proof. Throughout the century, perceptions of the role played by intuition in 
mathematics altered radically as mathematics went through several crises. Consequently,  
the notion of proof was further formalized. A modern variant, the two-column proof first 
appeared in Geometry textbooks about 1900. Two column proofs serve as a way to 
organize a series of statements (the left hand column) each one logically deduced from 
the previous one or based on definitions, axioms or previously proven theorem.  Wu 
(1996) notes that “although the choice of Euclidean geometry as a starting point of proofs 
may have been an historical accident, it is nevertheless a felicitous accident” (p. 228) 
because most people learning to prove a proposition for the first time find it easier to look 
at a picture than to think abstractly.   Over time, then, the Greek-inspired method of 
deductive proof came to play a central role in mathematics, though considering the 
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lengthy history of mathematical thought and practices, a greater emphasis on rigor is a 
relatively recent phenomenon (Hanna, 1983). 
Types of Proof  
An awareness of the ways in which mathematicians have categorized proof can help 
in understanding the concept.  Many classification systems have been put forth; however, 
there are four types of proof that mathematicians commonly identify.  
1) Proof by counter-example.  This type of proof involves finding at least one 
example in which a generalization is false. The counter-example will disprove the 
generalization or indicate its negation. A student, for instance, may conclude that a 
negative number plus a positive number is always a negative number, prompting 
another student to prove the conjecture wrong by offering a counter-example, 
 say -3 +7 = 4.  
2) Direct/Deductive proof.  In this case, one shows that a given statement is deducible 
by inferring patterns from given information, previously studied definitions, 
postulates and theorems. Traditionally, direct proofs have been expressed using two-
column or paragraph formats. They can also be presented in the “flow-proof format” 
suggested by McMurray (1978).  
3) Indirect Proof. With this type of proof, one assumes that the negation of a 
statement yet to be proven is true, then shows that this assumption leads to a 
contradiction. The following situation illustrates the process of an indirect argument. 
On arriving at the darkened library, Angela thinks, “The library must be closed”. The 
logic behind her thought is this: When libraries are open, patrons and employees 
require light; thus, the lights are likely to be turned on.  Right now, the lights are not 
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on; therefore, the library must be closed. Additionally, the process of proving a proof 
by proving its contra-positive can be thought of as a special case of indirect proof 
through contradiction. Paragraph formats are often used to show indirect proofs.  
4) Proof by induction. According to O’Daffer and Thornquist (1993), this is the most 
complex type of proof. It is based on the principle of mathematical induction and can 
be stated as follows:  If a given property is true for 1 and if for all n > 1, the property 
being true for n implies it is true for n + 1. Thus, we can conclude that the property is 
true for all natural numbers. 
In addition, mathematicians have suggested various other ways of classifying 
students’ justification and thought processes while they are involved in proving a 
mathematical task. Some of the well known classifications include those by van Hiele 
levels (Senk, 1989) and Sowder and Harel (1998). van Hiele’s levels are exclusive to 
geometry. Although Sowder and Harels’ classification is quite exhaustive, not all of their 
classifications can be applied to written works.  The most comprehensive classification of 
proofs was put forward by  Balaheff (1988, 1991).  Balacheff identified four categories of 
proofs: (1) naïve empiricism, (2) crucial experiment, (3) generic example and (4) thought 
experiment. Balacheff situated his taxonomy within a developmental model of proving 
skills. He argued that each of these four levels of mathematical proof could be classified 
within one of two broad categories that he termed pragmatic justifications and conceptual 
justifications. He called all justifications pragmatic when they focused on the use of 
examples, actions or showings.  He called justifications conceptual when they 
demonstrated abstract formulations of properties and relationships among properties.  
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Proof and Curriculum 
 Gardiner and Moreira (1999) claim that “mathematics is not proof; mathematics is 
not spotting patterns; mathematics is not calculation. All are necessary, but none is 
sufficient” (emphasis added; p. 19). Thus, they underscore that one cannot teach 
mathematics without teaching proof.  Furthermore, Wu (1996) reminds us that the 
production of a statement is the basic methodology whereby we can ascertain whether the 
statement is true or not. He also notes that, any one who wants to know what mathematics 
is about must therefore learn how to write down a proof or at least understand what a 
proof is. Wu further elaborates by saying that it is in fact in the mathematics courses 
where the students get their rigorous training in logical reasoning. Also, in mathematics, 
students learn how to cut through deceptive trappings to get at the kernel of a provable 
fact, where they learn how to distinguish between what is provable and what is not. 
Hence, learning how to write proofs is a very important component in the acquisition of 
such skills. 
In mathematics education, as Maher and Martino (1996) have argued, we are 
interested ultimately in student understanding, not just of mathematical principles but of 
the world itself, and proof and proving offer a means by which teachers might enhance 
student understanding. In fact, Marrades and Gutierrez (2000) insist that helping students  
“to [come to] a proper understanding of mathematical proof and [so] enhance their proof 
techniques” has become “one of the most interesting and difficult research fields in 
mathematics education” (p. 87). 
Although proofs “are the guts of mathematics” (Wu, 1996, p. 222), unfortunately, 
many secondary school students have little experience and even less understanding of 
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proof (Bell, 1976; Chazan, 1993; Hadas, Hershkowitz & Schwarz, 2000; Senk, 1985). To 
summarize these findings, one could say, proofs and proving have played a peripheral 
role at best in North American secondary school mathematics education (Knuth, 1999, 
2002a, 2002b). Knuth (2002a) observes that teachers tend to introduce students to 
mathematical proof solely through the vehicle of Euclidean geometry in the US.  Given 
this narrow application, it is not surprising that students develop little skill in identifying 
the objectives or functions of mathematical proof, or that both teachers and students come 
to perceive mathematical proof as a formal and meaningless exercise (Alibert, 1988; 
Knuth, 1999, 2002a, 2002b).  In general, students learn to imitate and memorize specific 
proof structures by observing the teacher and studying the textbook, but fail to understand 
the diverse nature, function, and application of mathematical proof (Hadas, Hershkowitz 
& Schwarz, 2000). There is no doubt that proving is a complex task that involves a range 
of student competencies such as identifying assumptions, isolating given properties and 
structures and organizing logical arguments. If teachers wish to teach students to think for 
themselves, and not simply fill their minds with facts, then as Hanna and Jahnke (1996) 
stress, it is essential that they place greater emphasis on the communication of meaning 
rather than on the formal derivation. In this respect, the teaching and learning of 
mathematical proof appears to have failed. (Hadas, Hershkowitz & Schwarz, 2000). 
Since 1989, the NCTM has called for substantive change in the nature and role of 
proof in secondary school mathematics curricula. The NCTM published the Curriculum 
and Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics (1989) at a time when the teaching of 
mathematical proof,—specifically within the US,— had almost disappeared from the 
curriculum or sunk into meaningless ritual (Knuth, 1999). In that document, the NCTM 
 13 
recommended that less emphasis be given to two-column proofs and to Euclidean 
geometry as an axiomatic system.  In general, recommendations call for a shift in 
emphasis from (what has often been perceived as) an over-reliance on rigorous proofs to 
a conception of proof as convincing argument (Hanna, 1990). Unfortunately, the NCTM 
document encouraged educators and students to think that verification techniques could 
substitute for proof (Latterell, 2005). In that sense this document failed to utilize the 
broader perspectives of proof in the teaching and learning of mathematics. In contrast, a 
more recent NCTM document, Principles and Standards for School Mathematics (2000), 
identifies proof as an actual standard and assigns it a much more prominent role within 
the school mathematics curriculum.  Accordingly, curriculum developers and program 
designers have come to expect that all students experience proof as an integral part of 
their mathematics education. Notably, the 2000 document recommends that reasoning 
and proof become a part of the mathematics curriculum at all levels from pre-
kindergarten through grade 12. The section entitled Reasoning and Proof outlines for the 
reader that students should be able to recognize reasoning and proof as fundamental 
aspects of mathematics, make and investigate mathematical conjectures, develop and 
evaluate mathematical arguments and proofs, and select and use various types of 
reasoning and methods of proof. Given the greater status assigned to proof within the 
mathematics curriculum, it is essential that teachers plan curricular experiences that can 
help students develop an appreciation for the value of proof and for those strategies that 
will assist them in developing proving skills.  
Any improvement in mathematics education for students depends upon effective 
mathematics teaching in the classroom. This includes providing students with 
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opportunities to interact in the classroom, to propose mathematical ideas and conjectures, 
to evaluate personal thinking, and to develop reasoning skills.  Teachers’ knowledge and 
beliefs will play an important role in shaping students’ understanding of math and their 
ability to solve mathematical problems (NCTM, 2000).  
A Practical Example: Proof Categories 
In order to help students develop proving skills, teachers must be able to 
anticipate the myriad ways in which students might answer a specific proving task. In the 
following section, I have identified a well-known proof problem and provide exemplars 
demonstrating how students might approach this problem.  
Prove that the sum of the first n positive integers (S(n)) is ( 1)
2
n n + . 
 
Proof Level 1: Naïve Empiricism 
 
Here the justification is based on the basis of a small number of examples. 
Balacheff (1988) calls this category of justification naïve empiricism. 
 
1+2+3 = 6.  
Here n=3.   
S(n) = ( 1)
2
n n + = 3(3 1)
2
+ = 6 
 
1+2+3+4+5+6+7 = 28 
Here n = 4. 
S(n) = ( 1)
2
n n + = 7(7 1)
2
+  = 28 
Since these two work, sum of the first n positive integers (S(n)) is ( 1)
2
n n + . 
This is the lowest level in his proof taxonomy. Balacheff (1988) (as well as other 
researchers; for example, Knuth (1999)) does not consider this a valid proof. However, 
Balacheff, includes it in his hierarchy of proofs because students typically think that this 
is a valid proof.  
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Proof Level 2: Crucial Experiment 
 
In this case, a conjecture is developed based on small number of examples and 
then that conjecture is verified using a larger number that is intentionally chosen. 
1+2+3 = 6.  
Here n=3.   
S(n) = ( 1)
2
n n + = 3(3 1)
2
+ = 6 
1+2+3+4+5+6+7 = 28 
Here n = 7. 
S(n) = ( 1)
2
n n + = 7(7 1)
2
+  = 28 
Since these two work, I will try one more example with a larger number using my 
calculator. 1+2+3+ …+54 = 1485.  
Here n= 54. S(n) = 54(54 1)
2
+ = 1485. 
Since the assertion works in this case too, the sum of the first n positive integers (S(n)) is 
( 1)
2
n n + . 
In fact, it is the intentionalilty that distinguishes naïve empiricism from crucial 
experiment. However, it is not always easy to distinguish between naïve empiricism and 
crucial experiment based on written work alone because, in both cases, the prover 
believes the conjecture proved on the basis of a small number of examples. Unless 
explicitly mentioned, it is easier to misread crucial experiment as naïve empiricism. 
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Proof Level 3: Generic Example 
 
In generic example, a single example is specifically analyzed and this analysis 
attempts to generalize from this single case.  
1+2+3+4+5+6+7 = 28 
Here n = 7. 
S(n) = 28, 28 = 7*4, 4 (the second number) comes from 8 ÷2 and 8 is obtained from 7+1 
which n+1. So integers S(n) = ( 1)
2
n n + . This is always the case.  
This example illustrates generic reasoning because the calculations and answers 
are specific to the fact that one is considering 1+2+3+4+5+6+7, but the justification 
provided would apply whatever the n might be. In other words, n can assume any value. 
The example is a generalization of a class, not a specific example. Although the focus is 
once is on one case, it is as an example of a class of objects. The example is selected to 
perform operations and transformations to arrive at a justification. The operations and 
transformations are applied to the whole class.  
Proof Level 4: Thought Experiment 
At the level of thought experiment, the students are able to distance themselves 
from the action and make logical deductions based only upon an awareness of the 
properties and the relationships characteristic of the situation. Here, actions are 
internalized and dissociated from the specific examples considered. The justification is 
based on the use of transformation of formalized symbolic expressions.  
I will provide two thought experiments. Both of these are adopted from Hanna 
(1990). 
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Thought Experiment – 1 
For n=1 it is true since 1 = 1(1 1)
2
+ . 
Assume it is true for some arbitrary k, that is S(k) = ( 1)
2
k k + . Then consider  
S(k+1) = S(k) + k+1 
           = ( 1)
2
k k +  + k+1. 
            = ( 1)( 2)
2
k k+ + . 
Therefore, the statement is true for k+1 if it is true for k. By induction, the statement is 
true for all n.  
Thought Experiment – 2 
This proof is similar to the well known Gauss formula. 
Let    S(n) =   1  +      2       + 3     + …..(n-1) +  n 
Then S(n)  =  n +     (n-1)  +(n-2) + …..   2   +  1 
Taking the sum of these two rows,  
         2 S(n) = (1 + n) + [2 + (n-1)] + [3 + (n-2)] + [4 + (n-3)] +….+ (n+1) 
                    = (n+1) + (n+1) + (n+1) + …+ (n+1) 
                    =  n(n+1) 
Therefore, S(n) = ( )( 1)
2
n n + . 
It can be noted that in both these examples the arguments are de-contextualized 
from the specifics of an example to the generic aspects of the problem; that is, mental 
operations and logical deductions aim to validate the conjecture in a general way. Hanna 
distinguishes between thought experiments 1 and 2 as follows: 1 is a proof that proves 
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and, 2, is a proof that explains. Note that the first proof, even though it proves the 
conjecture, does not provide insight into why the sum is ( )( 1)
2
n n + . However, the second 
proof, not only proves it, but also reasons why the sum must be equal to ( )( 1)
2
n n + .   
The second proof explains (or reasons) why the conjecture is true using the 
symmetry (two different representations of the sum S(n)property.) This simple example 
indicates that there are proofs that convince us of the result, but do not explain it. Hanna 
underlines that this explanatory value of proofs is the most important aspect of proofs and 
proving in school mathematics given that the teacher’s role is to “make student 
understand mathematics” (emphasis added; p. 12).  
Explanatory Vs. Rigorous Proofs 
It is quite understandable that in school mathematics, the explanatory nature of 
proof would be deemed extremely important.  I discuss below a response to a proof task, 
from Varghese (2007) that was submitted by a secondary school mathematics student 
teacher (student work follows the discussion). This student teacher’s response 
demonstrates the assumption that an informal proof is automatically an explanatory 
proof.  It is evident from this student teacher’s diagram that he understands clearly what 
an exterior angle is.  His scribbles indicate that he wanted to prove the task 
mathematically, rather than by verbal argument. It also seems that he tried to prove this 
task for a regular polygon since he produced drawings for the equilateral triangle, 
rectangle, regular pentagon, regular hexagon, and so on. He also provided a general 
formula for the size of an interior angle within a regular polygon. However, he got 
“stuck” and could not proceed. At that point, he likely resorted to the verbal argument. 
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According to Balacheff (1988, 1991)’s hierarchy, this narrative proof may be categorized 
as a verbal thought experiment.  
Now, the question remains: is this an acceptable mathematical proof from the 
perspective of standards deemed appropriated for the high school level? Even more from 
a prospective mathematics teacher?  I shared this proof with four secondary school 
mathematics teachers (in an informal discussion) and asked them whether or not it could 
be considered an acceptable mathematical proof. Three of the four teachers indicated that 
they would accept this as a valid mathematical proof and award it 100%. Indeed, they 
stressed that they found this an interesting way to prove the task. I am not generalizing 
from this observation, but it does raise the question: do we accept every convincing 
argument as a valid mathematical proof? 
 
 20 
 
In secondary school mathematics classrooms, teachers bear the responsibility of 
helping students effectively communicate using the language of mathematics. If we begin 
to accept any convincing argument as a mathematical proof assuming that all verbal 
arguments must be explanatory proofs, students are likely to confuse an informal 
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convincing argument with a mathematical proof. This will lead students to the faulty 
conclusion that any argument can automatically constitute a complete mathematical 
proof. As Moreira and Gradiner (1999) notes, there is a danger in such view since the 
methods used to “convince” are selected in order to achieve an effect. However, when 
proving a statement in mathematics, one is restricted in the methods one can use and the 
reasons one can give as this involves definitions, axioms, and the propositions which 
have been previously proved.   
Educators often complain that introducing “two-column” proofs at the secondary 
level is what puts students off; this is what compels them to protest, “I hate proof”. 
Watered- down treatment of mathematical proof may be why students find, in post 
secondary schools, the transition to ‘formal proof” extremely difficult (see Moore, 1994). 
Indeed, there are some mathematics educators who argue that secondary school is not the 
place for students to write rigorous, formal mathematical proofs, that teachers should 
postpone this work until post secondary school (see Wu, 1996). It seems that post 
secondary instructors assume that students in their classes will be able to handle formal 
proof (Moore, 1994; Wu, 1997). Given what is clearly the limited experience with formal 
proof that students have at the high school level, this would seem to be a false 
assumption.  
Indeed, not only do university and college instructors assume that students will be 
able to deal with formal proofs, but they also typically overwhelm students with rigorous 
proofs (Moore, 1994; Knapp, 2005). Furthermore, university instructors’ expectations as 
they pertain to formalism in proof are commonly quite high (Moore, 1994). Wu (1997) 
notes that university instruction is based on the “Intellectual Trickle-down Theory of 
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Learning: aim the teaching at the best students, and somehow the rest will take care of 
themselves” (p.5). He also notes that university instruction and courses are “forward 
looking” (if you don’t understand something in this course, you will understand it in the 
next course or courses). This “far-better-things to come” philosophy of university 
teaching (Wu, 1997, p. 7) and the fact that in secondary schools students lack sufficient 
experience with proof may very well explain why many mathematics students at the 
postsecondary level have unsophisticated understandings of mathematical proof.  
Varghese (2007) noted that student teachers have a limited facility in tackling 
mathematical proof tasks. Most of the student teachers’ in that study shared that they had 
only a limited exposure to mathematical proof in secondary school, and yet at university 
they felt that they were overwhelmed with mathematical proof. Wu (1996) claims that 
since “we are in an age when mathematical knowledge is at a premium, it does not seem 
proper that correct mathematical reasoning should be suddenly declared too profound and 
too difficult for all high school students” (p. 224).  I believe that high school students are 
capable of handling formal proofs as long as they do not experience an abrupt shift at 
Grade 10 or 11 from working with simplistic proofs to complex two-column proofs. One 
can easily transition from a mathematically sound explanatory proof to a formal two–
column proof as long as the transition is carefully managed. Indeed, the same is true of 
the movement from two-column proof to mathematically sound explanatory proof. And, 
as I noted above, Balchaeff’s taxonomy  may be used as the vehicle for transition to 
mathematically sound proof. Teachers could generate examples as per Balacheff’s 
hierarchy and teach students the fallacies associated with each of the lower level proofs. 
This may help to ensure that the transition to more formal proofs is a smooth one.  From 
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the following example one can easily note that it is quite easy to transition from a 
mathematically sound explanatory proof to a two-column proof.  
 
 
          
If E is the midpoint of BD  and AE EC≅ , Prove that AEB CED∆ ≅ ∆  
Explanatory Proof 
We know that E is the midpoint of BD  and that AE EC≅ .   Since E is the 
midpoint of BD , we know that BE ED≅  because the midpoint of a segment divides the 
segment into two congruent segments.  Since vertical angles are congruent, 
BEA DEC≅  .   When two triangles have corresponding angles and sides that are 
congruent as above, the triangles are congruent according to SAS (Side, Angle, Side) 
congruence. Thus AEB CED∆ ≅ ∆ , according to SAS method.  
 STATEMENT REASON 
1.  AE EC≅  Given 
2. BEA DEC≅   Vertical angles are congruent 
3. BE ED≅  E is a midpoint of BD  
Midpoint divides the segment 
into two congruent segments 
4 AEB CED∆ ≅ ∆  If two sides and the included 
angle of one triangle are 
congruent to the corresponding 
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parts of another triangle, the 
triangles are congruent 
according to SAS congruence. 
 
Rather than introducing formal mathematical proofs as if they were suddenly 
plucked from thin air, teachers would do well to introduce students gradually to different 
ways of writing proofs, culminating, after careful and strategic planning, with two 
column proofs. Most of the difficulties that teachers anticipate when it comes to teaching 
proof may be resolved if they introduced mathematical reasoning and proving in 
elementary school and continued the process through more and more challenging 
examples all the way through secondary school. Such a practice would certainly be in 
line with the recommendations of the NCTM (2000).  It is so unfortunate that many 
secondary students and, indeed, many secondary teachers regard two column proofs as 
‘the root of all evil’. In fact, two column proofs, as Wu (1996) asserts, make “most clear 
to a beginner what a mathematical proof really is: a connected sequence of assertions 
each backed up by a reason” (p. 227).  
Summary  
Without proof, Mathematics loses a great deal of its beauty. As Wu (1996) writes, 
Mathematics without proof is like “opera without [the] human voice”. If we want to see 
prominence of proof in school mathematics curriculum, then teachers must be prepared to 
teach concepts of mathematical proof at all levels within the school system. If a 
developmental model such as Balacheff’s taxonomy of proofs is applied in discussed in 
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class, students will understand the fallacies of pragmatic proofs and they will be far more 
likely to move to conceptual proofs.  
Explanatory function of proofs is clearly of great importance in an educational 
context, but it is also important that students learn how to communicate correctly using 
correct mathematical language: a verbal argument does not necessary constitute a 
mathematical proof. If watered-down proofs are accepted as the norm in school 
mathematics classrooms, students will have great difficulty understanding the scope and 
depth of the concept. We must remember that placing emphasis on the substantive part of 
mathematics (i.e. proofs) will help our students when they are expected to write proofs in 
real analysis, abstract algebra and advanced mathematical courses. For those students 
who go on to university, rigorous proofs will no longer seem so daunting; and for those 
university students who decide to become secondary school mathematics teachers, 
teaching mathematical proof in the classroom will no longer seem such an onerous and 
intimidating responsibility. As educators, we must do our best to prevent the “recycling 
effect” (Galbraith, 1982) that occurs when students who lack adequate understanding of 
critical concepts such as mathematical proof go on to become the next generation of 
teachers who are anxious, afraid, and reluctant to teach the critical concept of 
mathematical proof.  
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
References 
Alberta Learning (1996). Program of study for mathematics. Edmonton, Canada: Alberta  
Learning. 
 
Alibert, D. (1988). Towards new customs in the classroom. For the Learning of  
Mathematics, 8(2), 31-35. 
 
Almeida, D. (1996). Variation in proof standards: Implications for mathematics  
education. International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 
27(5), 659-665. 
 
Balacheff, N. (1988). Aspects of proof in pupils’ practice of school mathematics. In  
D. Pimm (Ed.) Mathematics, teachers and children, (pp. 216-235). (Trans. By D. Pimm). 
London: Hodder & Stoughton.  
 
Balacheff, N. ( 1991). Treatment of refutations: Aspects of the complexity of a  
constructivist approach to mathematical learning. In E.von Glassersfeld (Ed.) Radical 
Constructivism in Mathematics Education, pp. 89-110. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.  
Bell, A. (1976). A study of pupils’ proof-explanations in mathematical situations.  
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 7, 23-40. 
 
Chazan, D. (1993). High school geometry students’ justification for their views of  
 empirical evidence and mathematical proof. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 24, 
359-387. 
 
Davis, P. J. & Hersh, R. (1981). The mathematical experience. New York: Viking 
Penguin Inc. 
 
de Villers, M. (1990). The role and function of proof in mathematics. Pythagoras, 24, 17- 
24. 
 
de Villers, M.  (1999). Rethinking proof with the geometer’s sketchpad. Key Curriculum  
Press: Emeryville, CA.  
 
Dunham, W. (1994). Mathematical Universe. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
 
 27 
Frege, G.  (1950/1884).  The foundations of arithmetic: a logical-mathematic  
investigation into the concept of number. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Frege, G. (1984). Collected papers on mathematics, logic, and philosophy.  Brian  
McGuiness (Ed.) Trans. By Max Black.  Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
 
 
Galbraith, P.L., (1981). Aspects of proving: A clinical investigation of process. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 12(1), 1-28. 
 
Galbraith, P.L., (1982). The mathematical vitality of secondary mathematics graduates 
and prospective teachers: A comparative study. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 
13(1), 89-112. 
 
Gardiner, T & Moreira, C. (1999). Proof matters. Mathematics Teaching, 169, 17-21. 
 
Hadas, N., Hershkowitz, R., & Schwarz, B.B. (2000). The role of contradiction and 
uncertainty in promoting the need to prove in dynamic geometry environments.  
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 44 (1&2), 127-150. 
 
Hanna, G. (1983). Rigorous proof in mathematics education. OISE Press: Toronto.  
 
Hanna, G. (1990). Some pedagogical aspects of proof. Interchange. 21(1), 6-13.  
 
Hanna, G. (1991). Mathematical proof. In D. Tall (Ed.) Advanced mathematical thinking,  
(pp. 54-61). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 
 
Hanna, G. (1995). Challenges to the importance of proof. For the Learning of 
Mathematics. 15(3). 42-49. 
 
Hanna, G. (2000a). Proof, explanation and exploration: An overview. Educational 
Studies in Mathematics, 44(1), 5-23. 
 
Hanna, G. & Jahnke, H.N. (1993). Proof and application. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 24(4), 421-438. 
 
Hanna, G. & Jahnke, H.N.  (1996). Proof and proving. In A.J. Bishop, et al. (Eds.) 
International handbook of mathematics education, (pp. 877-908). Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht. 
 
Johnson, M.  (2007). Number theory and proving real theorems. Retrieved March 27, 
2007  www.stanford.edu/class/cs103a/handouts/24.%20Real%20Theorems.pdf.  
 
Joseph, G.G. (2000). The crest of the peacock: Non-European roots of mathematics.  
Princeton University Press: Princeton.  
 28 
 
Knuth, E.J. (1999). The nature of secondary school mathematic teachers’ conceptions of 
proof. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Colorado, United States. 
 
Knapp, J.(2005) Learning to prove in order to prove to learn. Retrieved December 15, 
2009, http://mathpost.asu.edu/~sjgm/issues/2005_spring/SJGM_knapp.pdf 
 
Knuth, E.J. (2002a). Secondary school mathematics teachers’ conceptions of proof. 
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education. 33, 379-405. 
 
Knuth, E.J. (2002b). Teachers’ conceptions of proof in the context of secondary school 
mathematics.  Journal for Mathematics Teacher Education. 5. 61-88. 
 
Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and Refutations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Latterell, C.M. (2005). Math wars: A guide for parents and teachers. Westport: Praeger. 
 
Leddy, J.F.J. (2001). Justifying and proving in secondary school mathematics.  
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. OISE, University of Toronto, Canada. 
 
Lucast, E.K. (2003). Proof as a method: A new case for proof in the mathematics 
curricula. Unpublished master’s thesis. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburg, United 
States. 
 
Luthuli, D. (1996). The proof of Euclidean geometry riders as an exercise in  
mathematical creativity. Pythagoras, 41, 17-26. 
 
Marrades, R., & Guiterrez, A. (2000). Proofs produced by secondary school students  
learning geometry in a dynamic computer environment. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics,  44, 87-125. 
 
Maher, C.A. & Martino, A.M. (1996). The development of the idea of mathematical  
proof: A five year case study. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education.  
27(2), 194-214. 
 
McMurray, R. (1978). Flow proofs in geometry. Mathematics Teacher. 71(11), 592- 
595. 
 
Moreira, C., & Gardiner, T. (1999). Reflections on proof in mathematics and 
mathematics education. In A. Ahmed, H. Williams, and J.H. Kraemer 
(Eds.) Cultural diversity in mathematics (education): Cheaem 51, (pp. 347-353). 
Chichester: Horwood Publishing. 
 
Moore, R. (1994). Making the transition to formal proof. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 27, 249-66 
 
 29 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (1989). The curriculum and evaluation  
standards for school mathematics.  Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of  
Mathematics. 
 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (2000). Principles and standards for 
school mathematics. Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
 
O’Daffer, P.G. & Thornquist, B.A. (1993). Critical thinking, mathematical reasoning and 
proof. In P.S. Wilson, (Ed.) Research ideas for the classroom: High school  
mathematics. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company: 
 
Polya, G. (1960). How to solve it. In J. R. Newman (Ed.) The world of mathematics 
 (Vol. III). Soho, London: Novello & Co., Ltd. 
 
Raman, M. J. (2002). Proof and justification in collegiate calculus. Unpublished  
doctoral dissertation. University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Reid, D. A. (1995). The need to prove. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of  
Alberta, Canada. 
 
Senk, S. L. (1985). How well do students write geometry proofs? Mathematics Teacher, 
78(6), 448-456. 
  
Senk, S. L. (1989). Van Hiele levels and achievement in writing geometry proofs.  
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education. 20(3), 309-321. 
 
Siu, M. (1993). Proof and pedagogy in ancient china: Examples from liu hui’s  
commentary on jiu zhang suan shu. Educational studies in mathematics, 24, 345- 
357.  
 
Sowder, L. & Harel, G. (1998). Types of students’ justifications. Mathematics teacher.  
91(8), 670-675. 
 
Thurston, W. (1995). On proof and progress in mathematics. For the Learning of 
Mathematics, 15(1), 29-37. 
 
Varghese, T. (2007). Student teachers’ conceptions of mathematical proof. Unpublished 
masters’ thesis. University of Alberta, Canada. 
 
Wilder, R. (1978). Evolution of Mathematical Concepts. Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press (original date of publication: 1968; New York: Wiley). 
 
Wu, H. (1996). The role of euclidean geometry in high school. Journal of  
 Mathematical Behavior. 15, 221-237. 
 
Wu, H. (1997). On the education of mathematics teachers. Retrieved March, 23, 2007  
 30 
         from math.berkeley.edu/~wu/teacher-education.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
